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Although there is broad agreement that the way that 
health care providers are paid affects their performance, 
the empirical literature on the impacts of provider 
payment reforms is surprisingly thin. During the 
1990s and early 2000s, many European and Central 
Asian countries shifted from paying hospitals through 
historical budgets to fee-for-service or patient-based-
payment methods (mostly variants of diagnosis-related 
groups). Using panel data on 28 countries over the period 
1990–2004, the authors of this study exploit the phased 
shift from historical budgets to explore aggregate impacts 
on hospital throughput, national health spending, and 
mortality from causes amenable to medical care. They 
use a regression version of difference-in-differences and 
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two variants that relax the difference-in-differences 
parallel trends assumption. The results show that fee-
for-service and patient-based-payment methods both 
increased national health spending, including private 
(out-of-pocket) spending. However, they had different 
effects on inpatient admissions (fee-for-service increased 
them; patient-based-payment had no effect), and average 
length of stay (fee-for-service had no effect; patient-
based-payment reduced it). Of the two methods, only 
patient-based-payment appears to have had any beneficial 
effect on “amenable mortality,” but there were significant 
impacts for only a couple of causes of death, and not in 
all model specifications. 
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1.  Introduction 
While there is broad agreement that the way that health care providers are paid 
affects their performance, and that payment reform ought to be an important 
component of any strategy to improve the efficiency of the health sector, the empirical 
literature on the impacts of provider payment reforms is surprisingly thin (cf. e.g. 
Docteur and Oxley 2003). There is a good deal of work describing changes in 
provider payment methods.
1 And there are studies that analyze likely impacts at a 
theoretical level.
2
The first limitation of the literature to date is that it focuses largely on one 
country—the United States, and in particular on the shift by Medicare in 1983 to 
paying hospitals through the use of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and subsequent 
adjustments to the new system.
 But empirical studies of the impacts of payment method changes 
are relatively few. Moreover, from a policymaking perspective, the literature that does 
exist has at least four limitations.  
3 There are exceptions, of course: a handful of studies 
have looked at the effects of shifts from fee-for-service or line-item budgets to 
prospective payments in the hospital sectors of other countries (notably  China, 
Hungary, Italy, Korea, Portugal, Sweden, and Taiwan).
4
                                                 
1 For example, a special issue of the journal Health Care Management Science (Busse et al. 2006) 
describes the shift to case-based payment systems in European hospitals.   
2  See e.g. Ellis and McGuire (1986), Frank and Lave (1989), and Ellis (1998).  
3  Examples include Davis and Rhodes (1988), Frank and Lave (1989), Cutler (1995), and Dafny 
(2005). 
 However, the fact remains 
that the impacts of payment reforms outside the US are largely unresearched.  
4 Louis et al. (1999) look at the effects on admissions, length of stay and hospital mortality of a shift in 
one region in Italy from global budgets to DRGs. Gerdtham et al. (1999) look at the effects on hospital 
efficiency of a shift among some county councils in Sweden from line-item budgets to prospective 
payments. Kroneman and Nagy (2001) look at the effects on hospital admissions, length of stay, and 
the bed-occupancy rate of a shift in Hungary from line-item budgeting to DRGs. Yip and Eggleston 
(2001) look at the effect on outlays by hospitals and the social health insurance fund of a shift by social     3 
A second limitation of the literature is that the studies to date have focused 
mostly on the hospitals that have been the subject of the payment reform. Most studies 
do not attempt to capture any impacts on other actors in the health system. Again, 
there are exceptions: some (see e.g. Cutler (1995) and Dafny (2005))  capture the 
impacts not just on hospital costs and activity rates but on the health outcomes (i.e. 
mortality) of the patients treated by the hospitals. However, conspicuous by their 
absence are studies that look at the system-wide impacts of provider payment reforms. 
It seems inevitable that some types of payment method are more costly for a payer to 
operate than others. Marini and Street (2007), for example, found that the shift from 
block contracts to activity-based payments in the NHS in England entailed a 
substantial net increase in transactions costs incurred by the payer.
5
                                                                                                                                            
insurers in one province in China from fee-for-service to prospective payments. Dismuke  and 
Guimaraes (2002) look at the effects on hospital mortality of a shift in Portugal from fee-for-service to 
DRGs. Kwon (2003) look at the effects on hospital costs of a shift in Korea from fee-for-service to 
DRGs. Lang et al. (2004) look at the effect on utilization and costs of a shift in Taiwan from fee-for-
service to DRGs.  
5 The higher costs are associated with volume control, data-collection (activity-based payment systems 
require accurate patient-level data), monitoring costs (including guarding against the equivalent of 
DRG creep), and enforcement of contracts.  
 Changes in the 
way that hospitals are paid may also be associated with changes in the amounts that 
patients pay out-of-pocket; hospitals may be able to make up for lower revenues from 
a public payer by charging patients more. Payment reforms may also alter utilization 
patterns across different types of providers. In response to payment reforms, hospitals 
may seek to deter complex patients from seeking care from them, or they may 
discharge patients early. As a result, patients may end up being treated elsewhere in 
the system, so that utilization rates and costs outside the hospital sector may be driven 
up, and population health might be adversely affected. Not knowing about these 
broader consequences of provider payment reform seems a potentially important gap 
in our knowledge.      4 
A third limitation of studies to date is that they have often been limited in 
scope, or the reforms analyzed have been limited in scope. The reforms in China, 
Italy,  and Sweden were limited to a small number of geographic areas, while the 
reform in Korea was just a pilot program for a limited number of hospitals. The 
studies in Portugal and Taiwan were limited to a small number of conditions, even 
though the payment reform concerned more conditions. In some studies, the reforms 
were limited to a small number of medical conditions or just one payer (Medicare in 
the US and the urban health insurance agency  in China).  Where the number of 
conditions involved is limited, or the number of payers involved is limited, it is 
possible that providers may engage in mitigating behavior, transferring costs to 
patients whose conditions are not covered by the new payment system or whose costs 
are paid by payers using unreformed payment mechanisms. Such studies may 
therefore be a poor guide to the effects of introducing payment reforms that affect all 
conditions and all payers.  
The final limitation of studies to date is that not all have been as analytically 
rigorous as they might have been, varying in particular in the degree to which they 
control for the confounding effects of observed and unobserved influences on the 
outcomes studied that may also be correlated with the payment reform. Some studies 
compare outcomes among providers with unreformed payment systems with those 
with reformed payment systems, while others compare outcomes before payment 
reforms with outcomes after payment reforms. The risk with such studies is that even 
if observable factors are controlled for by means of a regression model, there may be 
unobservable factors that differ between the unreformed and reformed providers, or 
that change after the provider payment reform is introduced. More compelling are 
studies  based on differences  in differences, i.e. changes in outcomes between     5 
providers with unreformed payment methods and providers with reformed payment 
methods. These are, however, relatively few in number.
6
The present study contributes to the empirical literature on the impacts of 
provider reforms, and tries to avoid the four limitations of the previous literature 
mentioned above. First, we examine the impacts of provider payment reforms in 28 
countries, all but one of which do not feature in the literature to date. All are located 
in  (Central and Eastern) Europe  and  Central Asia (ECA).
  
7
                                                 
6 Examples are Yip and Eggleston (2001) and Dafny (2005).   
 Many of the countries 
covered in the paper altered the way they pay hospitals during the 1990s, sometimes 
more than once, and sometimes as part of a broader provider payment reform strategy. 
To our knowledge, with the exception of DRG adoption in Hungary, the impacts of 
these reforms have not been analyzed in international journals. Second, our approach 
is to look at the impacts of these reforms at the level of the entire health system. Our 
unit of observation is not the individual hospital let alone the patient, but rather the 
country as a whole. Our results concerning impacts on health expenditures thus get at 
the effects of hospital payment reforms on health spending in the entire health system, 
not just expenditures incurred in the hospitals where the payment reform was 
implemented. Similarly, our results concerning impacts on amenable mortality get at 
the effects on mortality among the entire population, not just among patients admitted 
to hospitals whose payment methods were changed. Third, the reforms we examine 
are typically broad reforms that affect all hospitals, all payers (most countries have, in 
fact, just one payer), and a large number of conditions. Likewise our study is broad in 
scope; we analyze many outcomes, including hospital activity measures, health sector 
spending (public and  private), and amenable mortality. Fourth, our econometric 
7 The countries treated as being in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (the countries in the 
World Bank’s ‘ECA’ region) are listed in Figure 1.     6 
approach is a generalization of differences-in-differences (DID), which we employ on 
panel data covering the 28 countries over the period 1990 to 2004. Like DID, our 
approach eliminates the confounding effects of unobservables that remain constant 
over time. But unlike DID our approach relaxes the parallel trends assumption that 
some regard as the Achilles heel of DID.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the payment reforms in 
the ECA countries. Most went into the 1990s with a Semashko Soviet-style health 
system. Many shifted to a social health insurance model, and following this shift 
began to move away from the line-item budget method of paying hospitals. Some 
shifted to fee-for-service (FFS). Some moved to DRGs. Some shifted to FFS and then 
to DRGs. Some ended up making parallel payment reforms in the primary care sector, 
and some ended up imposing global  budgets on hospitals. We take these parallel 
reforms into account in our empirical analysis. An attraction of our study is that we 
are able to shed light on the relative merits of all three broad approaches to paying 
providers (Ellis and Miller 2008): payments based on provider characteristics (line-
item  budgets  being an example); payments based on service characteristics (FFS 
being an example); and payments based on patient characteristics (DRGs being an 
example). Section 3 sets out our hypotheses concerning the impacts of these payment 
method changes on the outcomes of interest, namely inpatient admissions, average 
length of stay, the number of beds, the bed occupancy rate, health sector spending, 
and amenable mortality (i.e. causes where timely and effective medical care can result 
in a premature death being avoided). Section 4 outlines our methods, including the 
tests we use to assess the validity of different models. We also outline our test of 
reverse causality, a concern being that DID models may not adequately account for 
the possibility that direction of causation runs not from payment reforms to changes in     7 
outcomes but rather vice versa. Countries that shifted payment system may have done 
so out of a concern over underlying health system weaknesses causing poor outcomes. 
Section 5 introduces our data, including our payment method classificatory variables. 
Inevitably there is some arbitrariness about these at the margin, so we have assessed 
the robustness of our results to alternative classifications. Section 6  presents our 
results, both of the specification tests and our estimates of payment method impacts. 
Section 7 contains our conclusions.  
2.  Provider payment reforms in the ECA countries   
In almost all the former communist countries of the ECA region, the health 
care sector was organized exclusively along the lines of the centrally planned 
Semashko model during the communist era.
8
                                                 
8 This section draws heavily on Dixon et al. (2004) and the Health Systems in Transition (HiT) series, 
downloadable from 
 Characteristically, this meant general 
revenues financing in addition to out-of-pocket payments—the latter primarily taking 
the form of payments for drugs and “gratuities” paid by patients to providers. The 
state normally owned the whole network of health care providers with no participation 
of a private sector. Salaries were the prevalent form of paying medical doctors and 
other health professionals. Providers were organized in a tiered system and historical, 
line-item budgeting was used to reimburse hospitals; that is, budgets or block grants 
were allocated to hospitals according to population-based and, mainly, capacity norms 
(such as the number of beds, the most commonly used criterion). From year to year, 
the historical budget accruing to a given hospital could be adjusted by some inflation 
factor, yet there was rarely any reallocation across spending categories. 
http://www.euro.who.int/observatory/Hits/TopPage.      8 
The sharp decline in GDP and government revenues as a share of GDP in the 
early years after the transition to capitalism (caused by factors such as the growth of 
the private and informal sectors  where tax compliance was lower, a shrinking of 
traditional tax bases such as state-owned enterprises, and pressures for tax cuts from a 
population experiencing declines in real income) had dramatic consequences for the 
health sector organization in the countries of the ECA region, owing above all to 
substantial cuts in government health expenditures. A number of countries responded 
to the challenges of protecting health spending and improving performance in the 
sector by changing the health financing mechanism after transition, from tax-finance 
towards social health insurance arrangements.
9
Several countries of the region also tried to rationalize spending and improve 
performance by reforming the way primary care providers and hospitals (the biggest 
spenders  in a  health sector)  are  paid, with or without a switch to social health 
insurance. For the payment of primary care doctors, salaries were often replaced over 
  A purchaser-provider split was 
introduced in three-quarters of the ECA countries—yet sometimes without the typical 
reliance of health insurance systems on payroll taxes as the main source of health care 
funding, for instance in Latvia and Poland—and was normally accompanied by the 
introduction of contracting with both public and private providers. Contracting with 
private hospitals was permitted and implemented in practice in about half of the ECA 
countries at some point between 1990 and 2004; private providers contracted even 
more frequently in primary care. Nonetheless, selective contracts seem to have been 
actually used in less than half of the countries where a purchaser-provider split was 
introduced.  
                                                 
9 Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra (2008) describe the evolution of this process in the ECA region and 
investigate the consequences of social health insurance adoption on a number of health sector 
outcomes.     9 
the 1990s and early 2000s by systems based mainly on capitation, complemented by 
fees paid for preventive actions such as vaccinations, strip tests, cancer screening and 
electrocardiograms, plus salaries in some cases. This is the case, for instance, of 
Estonia, Latvia and the Slovak Republic. Countries such as Albania, Bulgaria and 
Hungary had pure capitation-based systems in place for primary care doctors at some 
point during the 1990s, whereas others introduced mixtures of salaries and capitation 
(e.g. Moldova and Turkmenistan). In about a third of the cases, payment reforms in 
primary care took place at the same time countries reformed their hospital 
reimbursement systems—e.g. in Armenia, Poland and the Slovak Republic—yet most 
countries switched from salaries in primary care without  concurrent changes in 
hospital payment,  and  sometimes  before  reforming their hospital reimbursement 
systems for the first time (Hungary and Romania are examples of the latter). Overall, 
around  two-thirds of the ECA countries changed the way they pay primary care 
physicians at least once between 1990 and 2004. Finally, six former USSR republics 
and other countries (such as Serbia and Montenegro) maintained the old salary-based 
payment system for primary care doctors during the whole period of study. 
For hospitals, most ECA countries abandoned historical budgets—a payment 
system normally based only on provider  characteristics—as the primary hospital 
reimbursement method in favor of new payment mechanisms based on characteristics 
of the services provided or patient characteristics. These new payment arrangements 
can be assigned to two broad categories: fee-for-service (FFS) variants and patient-
based payment (PBP) methods.  The former category  includes  reimbursement 
mechanisms whereby hospitals are paid for each service provided to a patient, i.e. by 
per diem or bed-days, and also per procedure (hospital inputs such as laboratory tests, 
drugs, surgeries  and specialist consultations).  In the second category, PBP     10 
arrangements, hospital reimbursement is mainly based on patient characteristics such 





 presents the timing of changes in the predominant hospital payment 
method  between the three reimbursement categories—historical  budgets, FFS and 
PBP—in the countries of the ECA region, for the period 1990-2004.
11
                                                 
10 See Ellis and Miller (2008). 
11  Predominant hospital payment methods are defined according to their weight in terms of local 
hospitals’ total revenues. 
 The figure also 
shows the pattern of introduction of prospective global budgets (caps on the amount 
reimbursed or services provided at the hospital level) in these countries, normally 
used alongside FFS or PBP. By 1995, eight of the 28 ECA countries had already 
moved away from historical budgets as the predominant hospital payment method, 
namely  Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Macedonia, Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia. In all but one of these cases, FFS variants—often mixtures of 
per diem and per procedure methods—were the preferred approach to first replace the 
Semashko norms (even if only for a short period of time, as in Macedonia). Local 
versions of global budgets for hospitals were introduced alongside FFS at some point 
of the early 1990s in the Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovenia, whereas in Lithuania 
reimbursement caps were introduced and used when line-item budgets were still the 
predominant payment method for most hospitals. By contrast, only in Hungary was 
PBP chosen as the predominant hospital payment method prior to 1995, although 
social health insurance agencies in other countries (such as Kazakhstan, Lithuania and 
the Russian Federation) experimented with simple DRG or case-based approaches 
before that date. It has been argued that, in addition to the hoped-for benefits in terms 
of increased hospital productivity and revenues, the new payment methods introduced     11 
in the first half of the 1990s were often selected because of their limited data and 
capacity requirements.
12
The different degrees of technical expertise and success to achieve the desired 
protection of health spending levels and system performance between countries led 
most of the “early reformers” to make additional adjustments to their reimbursement 
systems in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s. Thus,  Croatia,  Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia all reformed 
the predominant hospital payment method  for a second (or third) time after their 
initial move away from line-item budgets, often by adding global budgets to their 
current reimbursement arrangement  (e.g. Croatia, Estonia) but also by moving 
towards PBP methods (e.g. Czech Republic, Slovenia).
  
13
3.  Likely effects of provider payment reforms  
 Moreover, other countries 
switched from budgets for the first time in the same period—such as Armenia, 
Kyrgyz Republic and Poland—and even adopted a new payment system as late as 
2004 (Moldova). In the latter group of countries, payment reforms tended to favor the 
introduction of DRG  systems with  distinct  degrees of complexity,  sometimes 
accompanied  or followed  by the implementation of global budgets at the hospital 
level as an attempt to limit potential increases in spending encouraged by the new 
reimbursement methods. 
We discuss next the possible impacts of the “new” reimbursement methods 
introduced into the ECA countries during the 1990s on our selected health sector 
                                                 
12 Dixon et al. (2004). 
13 Interestingly, at the end of 1998, the Slovak Republic reverted from per diem reimbursement for 
hospitals towards a system of budget payments based mainly on historical costs, which was the 
predominant arrangement until 2002 when DRGs were introduced.     12 
indicators. These include indicators of hospital activity, national health spending and 
mortality amenable to health care.  For convenience, Table  1  summarizes our 
hypothesized effects (as well our main results).  
Hospital admissions. We hypothesize that a shift to FFS or PBP is likely to 
increase admissions, because unlike hospitals financed through budgets, hospitals 
financed via FFS and PBP gain financially from additional admissions.
14 The gain is 
potentially greater for a PBP-paid hospital because a FFS-paid hospital may be able to 
earn additional revenues from existing patients, by delivering more diagnostic tests, 
more intensive treatment, and so on. Hence, while we expect the effect on admissions 
of shifting from budgets to FFS and to PBP to be positive, we expect a shift to PBP to 
produce the larger impact.
15
Average length of stay. We hypothesize that shifting from budgets to PBP is 
likely to reduce average length of stay (ALOS), while a shift from budgets to FFS 
may or may not reduce ALOS. A PBP-paid hospital gains no extra revenue from 
keeping a patient an extra day, and forgoes the revenue that could have been earned 
on a new admission.
  
16
                                                 
14 See, for instance, Ellis and McGuire (1986), Ellis (1998) and Jegers et al. (2002). 
15  Theoretically, smaller positive impacts of PBP and FFS on admissions compared to line-item 
budgets may well be the case if hospitals are able to select the most profitable patients, that is, those 
who would result in higher net revenues for a given hospital due to their DRG rates (in the case of 
PBP) or typical length of stay, type and number of medical procedures (in the case of FFS 
arrangements).  
16 See Frank and Lave (1989) and Jegers et al. (2002), among others. 
  A budget-paid hospital also gains nothing from keeping a 
patient in hospital an extra day but since its revenue would not increase if it 
discharged the patient early and admitted another there is no opportunity cost to 
keeping the patient in an extra day. A FFS-paid hospital, by contrast, may be able to 
earn extra profits from keeping a patient in hospital longer. This depends on the type     13 
of FFS system in place. Some countries have operated a pure per diem FFS system.
17 
The incentive in this case depends on whether reimbursement rates are set above the 
marginal cost of an additional day. If they are, hospitals have an incentive to keep 
patients in longer; if they are not, hospitals do not.
18 Other countries have a FFS 
system where providers are paid only per procedure. In this case, the incentive is to 
limit ALOS and treat patients more intensively on the days they are in hospital.
19
Beds and bed occupancy rates. Hospitals paid by historical budgets have a 
strong incentive to maintain high bed stocks since budgets are often based (and were 





However, they have little incentive to keep their beds full. The effect on beds and bed-
occupancy rates of shifting from budgets to FFS or to PBP depends on how the 
payment change affects the number of inpatient days; the latter is equal to the product 
of  the number of  admissions  (N)  and ALOS  (S), which by the bed occupancy 
constraint must also equal the number of beds (B) multiplied by the bed occupancy 
rate (R) times 365: 
365 ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ R B S N . 
Our hypothesized effects on inpatient days of shifting from budgets to FFS and PBP 
are ambiguous: shifting to PBP is hypothesized to raise admissions but reduce ALOS, 
while shifting to FFS is hypothesized to raise admissions (albeit by less) and may 
                                                 
17 This was the case, for example, in Latvia (until 1996) and the Slovak Republic.  
18 The latter supply response was identified by Frank and Lave (1989) in the context of the American 
states’ Medicaid reimbursement policies. 
19 Macedonia (1991) and the Czech Republic (1995-96), for example, introduced “pure” per procedure 
mechanisms. The fact that most countries  who implemented FFS in our sample actually opted for 
mixed  per diem/per procedure mechanisms during the period of study  (e.g. Croatia, Estonia and 
Romania) makes even more ambiguous the expected impact of our broad FFS category on ALOS.  
20 It is therefore of little surprise that the vast majority of the former communist countries of the ECA 
region entered the 1990s with an oversupply of hospital beds and excess capacity in general. See, 
among other reports, the World Health Organization’s Health Systems in Transition (HiT) series.     14 
increase or decrease ALOS. In both cases the effect on inpatient days (the left-hand 
side of (1))—and hence the product of the bed occupancy rate and the bed stock (the 
right-hand side of (1)—is ambiguous. However, it seems reasonable to hypothesize 
that unlike budget-paid hospitals, FFS-paid and PBP-paid hospitals have little 
incentive to have beds lying empty, and therefore insofar as they are able to adjust 
their bed stocks, as they shift from budgets to either alternative method, hospitals will, 
ceteris paribus, try to increase the bed-occupancy rate.  
Cost per admission and quality. We are not able to explore impacts on these 
aspects of hospital care, but they are clearly important influences on two variables we 
are able to include in our empirical analysis: total health expenditure and amenable 
mortality. So, it is worth spending a few moments hypothesizing about the impacts of 
different payment mechanisms on them. 
The budget-paid hospital  has no incentive to worry unduly  about cost per 
admission or quality; if budgets are tight, hospitals might admit large numbers of 
patients and skimp on quality.
21
                                                 
21 Cf. e.g. Jegers et al. (2002). 
 A PBP-based hospital, by contrast, has a definite 
incentive to minimize its cost per admission, since it keeps any shortfall from the 
amount paid for the casetype in question. So, we hypothesize that shifting from 
historical budget to PBP is likely to result in a reduction in cost per admission. Insofar 
as some of the cost reduction is achieved by applying less inputs (including through a 
shorter ALOS), this may compromise the quality of care, depending on the value-
added in terms of health status of the reduced inputs. The effect on cost per admission 
of shifting from budgets to FFS, by contrast, is unclear a priori. The FFS-paid hospital 
will balance the extra profits from admitting more patients against the extra profits     15 
from treating existing patients more intensively. Given the scope for generating 
additional revenues from already admitted patients, its cost per admission may well 
end up higher than the cost per admission in a budget-paid hospital. And insofar as the 
extra services are associated with marginal increments in health status, the effect on 
quality of a shift from budgets to FFS may also be expected to be positive.
22
The effects on a country’s total health spending will depend on the reform’s 
impact on total costs in the hospital sector, but also on costs elsewhere in the sector. It 
seems likely that both FFS and PBP entail higher administrative costs than a budget-
based payment system—billing costs, the costs of monitoring and adjusting schedules, 
etc. The impacts on total health spending also depend on any adjustments that occur 
elsewhere in the health system. For instance, if encouraged by the new high-powered 
incentives hospitals who were previously paid by budget begin admitting patients who 
could perfectly well have been treated in an ambulatory or a community-care setting, 
 Much 
will depend on the fee schedule: the more generous it is, the more hospitals will be 
happy to earn additional revenues by increasing the cost per admission, and the more 
tilted the schedule is toward medically effective services, the more beneficial this will 
be for patients’ health status.  
Total hospital costs and total health spending. Shifting from budgets to FFS is 
hypothesized to increase admissions and may increase costs per admission. Total 
hospital costs ought, therefore, to increase. By contrast, shifting from budgets to PBP 
is also hypothesized to increase admissions but the cost per admission is likely to fall; 
the effect of shifting from budgets to PBP on total hospital  spending is therefore 
ambiguous a priori.  
                                                 
22 See Ellis and McGuire (1986); Frank and Lave (1989); and Ellis (1998), among others.     16 
system costs are likely to rise. Shifting away from historical budgets to both FFS and 
PBP is also likely to have implications for the number of hospitals in the system. For 
example, the payment change may result in new (private) entrants into the hospital 
market. If the old hospitals contract (as in most ECA countries), there may be some 
loss of economies of scale, or not depending on where they are relative to their 
minimum efficient scale, and where the new entrants are relative to theirs. The overall 
effect will also depend on where the new entrants’ cost curves lie in relation to the 
incumbents’. 
Health status. As a result of the potential variations in rates of throughput, 
quality of care and health spending, one could reasonably expect such changes to be 
reflected also in different  rates of mortality, if only mortality amenable to health 
care.
23
                                                 
23 Nolte and McKee (2008). 
 FFS systems may encourage providers to raise cost per admission by treating 
patients more intensively than under a budget system, potentially leading to increased 
quality of care and resulting in better health status as measured, for instance, by 
avoidable hospital deaths. The actual effect will depend on how medically effective 
the additional services provided under FFS are. By contrast, PBP methods seem likely 
to stimulate reductions in cost per admission which may end up in patients being 
underserved, thus leading to lower quality of care than under budgets or FFS systems. 
Again, the impacts of shifts from budgets to PBP on health status will depend on how 
the likely reductions in cost per admission are achieved; if PBP-paid hospitals tend to 
discharge patients earlier than appropriate, or limit admissions of complex cases, or 
cut back on beneficial inputs (e.g. diagnostic exams and personnel time), switches 
from budgets to PBP methods could lead to adverse effects on amenable mortality.      17 
4.  Methods 
In order to assess the aggregate impacts of provider  payment methods on 
system-wide health sector outcomes, we implement an empirical approach analogous 
to that adopted in our previous paper which investigates the impacts of social health 
insurance adoption in the ECA region (Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra 2009), to which 
the reader is referred for more details. 
Let yit be the health sector outcome of interest in country i at time t, Xit be a 
vector of covariates  which might potentially influence both the outcome and  the 
provider payment method in place, and FFSit and PBPit be dummy variables taking on 
the value of 1 if country i at time t has a fee-for-service or patient-based payment 
system  as the predominant hospital reimbursement method, respectively (the base 
category is “historical budgets/block grants”). The basic model is expressed as: 
(2)  it it it it it y X FFS PBP e γδ ϕ = +++  
where the term eit captures unobservables and noise. The coefficients of interest are δ 
and φ, which give the impacts of fee-for-service and patient-based payment methods 
(respectively) on the outcome yit. If the payment method dummies are correlated with 
eit (i.e. the choice of hospital reimbursement method is endogenous), estimation of 
eqn (2) by pooled OLS would result in a biased estimate of δ and φ. It could be, for 
example,  that countries with unobserved characteristics that led to higher-than-
expected levels of health spending may deliberately avoid paying hospitals through 
fee-for-service arrangements because of the associated incentives towards increased 
health service production and spending in such environment. Or it might be that other 
important institutional changes or events occurred broadly around the same time that     18 
the countries changed their predominant hospital  payment method. If we fail to 
capture these in our model but instead implicitly include them in eit, and if they affect 
the outcomes of interest, our estimates of δ and φ will be biased. We use a basic 
difference-in-differences estimator  and two generalizations of that  approach to 
account for the possible endogeneity of the payment method dummies.  
4.1   The differences-in-differences model  
The simplest way to allow for such a correlation is to let:  
(3)  it t i it e ε θ α + + = , 
where θt is a period-specific intercept, αi is a country-specific effect which captures 
time-invariant unobservables that are potentially correlated with the provider payment 
method in place, and εit is an idiosyncratic error term (iid over i and t). Substituting 
eqn (3) in eqn (2) gives 
(4)  it it it it i t it y X FFS PBP γδ ϕ αθε = + + +++ . 
Taking first differences of eqn (4) gives 
(5)  it it it it t it y X FFS PBP γδ ϕ ξ ε ∆ =∆ + ∆ + ∆ + +∆ , 
which can be consistently estimated by pooled OLS if the endogeneity of the payment 
method choice is adequately captured by the error term specified in eqn (3).
24
                                                 
24 Standard errors need to be adjusted for clustering at the country level to allow for serial correlation 
(cf. Bertrand et al. 2004; Cameron and Trivedi 2005 p.705). 
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4.2   The random trend model  
The  generalized difference-in-differences (DID) estimator shown above 
assumes a parallel or common trend: the θt do not depend on the values of FFSit and 
PBPit, and therefore the health systems that switch from historical budgets to either 
FFS or PBP (or between FFS and PBP) exhibit the same trend among them, and the 
same trend as the “untreated” countries that remain with budgets as the predominant 
reimbursement method over the entire period of study. In reality, there may be time-
varying unobservables that are correlated with both yit and the choice of provider 
payment arrangement. A model that allows this parallel trend assumption (PTA) to be 
relaxed is the “random trend” (RT) model (cf. e.g. Wooldridge 2002 p.316). Eqn (3) is 
replaced by the assumption 
(6)  it i t i it t k e ε θ α + + + = . 
This allows for the possibility that different countries have different trends, as 
reflected in different values of ki. Substituting eqn (6) in eqn (2) gives 
(7)  it it it it i t i it y X FFS PBP k t γδ ϕ αθ ε = + + +++ + , 
which can be estimated by differencing eqn (7) and using a fixed effects estimator on 
the resultant equation: 
(8)  it it it it t i it y X FFS PBP k γδ ϕ ξ ε ∆ =∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + +∆ . 
If the ki are jointly insignificant, eqn (8) collapses to eqn (5), which would provide 
evidence in support of the PTA. Yet even if the ki were jointly significant, the PTA 
would still be a reasonable assumption if the ki are uncorrelated with FFSit and PBPit.     20 
The latter can be tested for each outcome of interest through a  (two-variables) 
generalized version of the Hausman test of fixed versus random effects which takes 
into account the clustered nature of our data and is implemented by estimating an 
auxiliary  quasi-demeaned regression (cf. Wooldridge 2002 p.290). For each 
dependent variable, we implement this test by estimating an augmented version of eqn 
(8) using a random effects estimator—adding the within-country panel means of the 
original covariates which vary over i  and  t  as regressors—and testing the null 
hypothesis of joint insignificance of the two additional payment methods terms (with 
cluster-robust standard errors). Non-rejection of this hypothesis would suggest that the 
ki are uncorrelated with FFSit and PBPit and thus provide evidence in favor of the 
parallel trend assumption. 
4.3   The differential trend model  
The RT model is less restrictive than the standard DID model (the latter is 
nested in the  former), but nonetheless suffers potentially from two problems: the 
assumed trend is linear; and the trend is specific to the country and assumed not to be 
modified by a change of the hospital payment method in place. Another model that 
allows the PTA to be relaxed is a generalization of the “differential trend” (DT) model 
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In this specification, mt  is an unobserved trend, the influence of which on yit  is 
allowed to differ between health systems according to their predominant hospital     21 
payment method: FFS, PBP or budgets. Incorporating this assumption into eqn (2) 
gives: 
(10)  ( ) ( ) ,
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from which we can get a first-differenced estimating equation: 
(11)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
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In the estimation, the Δmt are replaced by first differences of year dummies, and 
Δ(mtFFSit) and Δ(mtPBPit) are replaced by first differences of interactions between 
year dummies and the hospital payment dummies.  The estimating equation is thus: 
(12) 
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which can be estimated by pooled OLS. In this model the impact of each alternative 
provider payment method varies over time, but one can estimate the average impact of 





















The PTA assumption in this model  implies  kf=kp=kb.  This can be tested 
indirectly by jointly testing two nonlinear restrictions:     22 
(14) 
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4.4   Testing for reverse causality  
Although our DID, RT and DT models all allow for some correlation between 
the payment method in place and  the original error term eit, they entail specific 
assumptions that may not adequately capture the endogeneity of the hospital payment 
dummies. It has long been recognized that governments tend to reform the provider 
payment methods in place as a response to the aggregate trajectory of the health sector 
(Newhouse 1977); for instance, a country may change its predominant hospital 
reimbursement system exactly as a way to tackle historically high or increasing health 
spending. Reverse causality of this form is likely to be present in most cross-country 
analyses dealing with the impacts of the different institutional characteristics of health 
systems and, if also present in our data, means that difference-in-differences 
generalizations of the sort described above will not properly capture the endogeneity 
of provider payment methods. 
An informal yet intuitive test of reverse causality based on that proposed by 
Gruber and Hanratty (1995) in a similar modelling exercise is to include in each of 
our three  models two lead dummy variables, the first  indicating whether a FFS 
method will be adopted the following year, and the other indicating whether a PBP 
arrangement will be introduced in the following year. If, in our models, causality goes 
from the provider payment method in place to the outcome variable, the coefficients 
on the lead dummies will be zero. Nonzero coefficients would point towards causality     23 
running the other way or some other type of endogeneity that cannot be captured by 
the model in question. We perform reverse causality tests for all the models estimated 
in this paper. 
5.  Data  
We use annual data on provider payment methods in place and health sector 
outcomes for the  28  ECA countries, from 1990 to 2004.
25
5.1   Hospital payment methods 
  Our dataset has been 
constructed using a variety of sources; the description in this section begins with our 
independent variables of interest, hospital payment methods, and then continues for 
our other variables.  
We have used information contained in a number of sources—mainly  the 
World Health Organization’s Health Systems in Transition (HiT) series, in addition to 
personal communications with World Bank staff and a variety of country reports—to 
classify a country’s predominant hospital payment method in a given year as (i) 
historical  budgets or block grants (the prevailing method under the communist 
Semashko system), (ii) fee-for-service (FFS), or (iii) patient-based payment (PBP). 
Our FFS dummy is defined as taking the value of one at time t if hospitals in country i 
are mostly reimbursed (i.e. derive the majority of their revenues) through variants of 
the “classic”  FFS arrangement in which hospitals are paid per procedure; 
arrangements whereby hospitals are reimbursed mainly by per diem variants; or a 
mixture of both arrangements. Our PBPit variable takes the value of one if the main 
                                                 
25 In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the period between 1992 and 1996 has been excluded from the 
analysis due to the lack of data for some variables and the complete disorganization of the health 
system during the war period.     24 
hospital payment method in country  i  at time t  is based instead  on patient 
characteristics—rather than characteristics of  the  providers  or services offered—
including per case, DRG-based and similar prospective methods (cf. Ellis and Miller 
2008).
26
Of the 28  countries in our sample, 17 switched from the use of historical 
budgets to either FFS or PBP as the main hospital reimbursement method at some 
point between 1990 and 2004 (see 
 
Figure 1); some switched to FFS or PBP and stuck 
with the  chosen method, while others switched subsequently between these two 
arrangements. Our FFS and PBP dummies are equal to 1 in around 19% and 21% 
(respectively) of the typical estimation sample for a given health outcome.  
5.2   Outcome variables  
Our system-wide health outcomes include: hospital activity rates and capacity 
utilization;  per capita health spending; and  seven measures of mortality, all 
corresponding to causes of death with an important component amenable to health 
care.
27
Our indicators of hospital activity and capacity utilization are the number of 
inpatient care admissions  and five disease-specific discharges  (circulatory, 
cerebrovascular, respiratory, digestive, and musculoskeletal system diseases); the 
 Variable definitions and sources are briefly described below.   
                                                 
26 We follow the previous empirical literature by establishing predominant payment methods for each 
country-year combination (see, for instance, Gerdtham and Jonsson 2000), in light of the information 
contained in a variety of sources and the theoretical classification of provider payment methods 
suggested by Ellis and Miller (2008). Since, at any given year, countries may use a mix of FFS and 
PBP methods to reimburse hospitals for a given type of service provided, no “all inclusive” 
classification is free from criticism. For those country-year combinations where a secondary payment 
method also seemed important in terms of hospital revenues as far as we could establish (e.g., by 
accounting for 40% or more of the local hospitals’ reimbursement), we explore the robustness of our 
results to reclassifying the countries according to the relevant secondary payment method and re-
running the models (see Section 6). 
27 Unfortunately, we were unable to find usable panel data on costs per admission for our sample of 
ECA countries.     25 
average length of stay for all hospitals; the number of beds; and the bed occupancy 
rate. Except for the number of beds which was taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database, the source for hospital-level data was the 
World Health Organization’s Health for All database. 
Annual health spending per capita  (total and disaggregated as public and 
private spending) was obtained from the WDI database and is measured in constant 
2000 dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity. The Health for All database was 
the source for the seven amenable mortality indicators investigated here: these are the 
standardized death rates for ischemic heart disease, diabetes, cerebrovascular diseases, 
female breast cancer,  appendicitis,  hernia and intestinal obstruction, and adverse 
effects of therapeutic agents.  
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2 for the full sample—across the 
whole period of study and all countries—and separately according to the predominant 
hospital reimbursement method observed.  Country-year combinations with 
reimbursement by PBP and, especially, FFS present higher hospital activity rates, as 
reflected by more inpatient admissions and generally higher numbers of disease-
specific discharges. PBP systems exhibit lower average length of stay and fewer 
hospital beds than either FFS or budget systems, and FFS observations present the 
highest bed occupancy rates. In our sample, total health expenditures are considerably 
higher for PBP and FFS country-year combinations than in those combinations where 
historical budgets were observed, with FFS associated with the highest average total 
spending and substantially higher public spending. Finally, budget systems exhibit 
higher amenable mortality rates than FFS and PBP for four of the seven causes of 
death, yet neither FFS nor PBP observations clearly dominate in terms of mortality     26 
improvements vis-à-vis budgets. Our empirical work investigates  whether the 
relationships described above represent causal effects from the introduction of 
different provider payment methods across countries or are mere  correlations 
reflecting selection effects.   
5.3   Covariates in the estimating equation 
We follow most of the previous empirical literature (see Gerdtham and 
Jonsson 2000) and include as covariates in our models GDP per capita (measured in 
constant 2000 dollars and purchasing power adjusted), the share of the population 
aged 65 or above, and the urban population as a fraction of the total. Data on these 
three covariates come from the WDI database. Following Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra 
(2009), who found that the introduction of social health insurance (SHI) in many 
countries of the ECA region during the 1990s had impacts on some of the outcomes 
examined in this study, we include in the covariates set a dummy variable for whether 
the country has a SHI system in place in a given year.
28
As described in Section 
 
2, a number of ECA countries reformed also the way 
primary health care providers are paid, in addition to payment reforms in inpatient 
care. In some countries, payment reforms for primary care providers and hospitals 
were implemented simultaneously, whilst in most instances (two-thirds) they took 
place at different points in time between 1990 and 2004. It seems important to isolate 
the impacts of payment reforms in primary care for the ECA countries not only 
because  such reforms have occurred in  budget, FFS and PBP systems alike, but 
especially because, where hospital and primary care payment reforms were coupled, 
                                                 
28 Tax-financed system is the reference category. For the subset of SHI countries, switches between 
hospital payment methods did not occur in the same year as SHI adoption in 60% of the cases. For 
more details on the data sources, construction of the SHI dummy and the resulting classification of 
countries as tax-financed or SHI systems, see Wagstaff and Moreno-Serra (2009).     27 
this occurred differently and may have introduced distinct incentives across health 
care systems. For example, in a few countries hospitals started to be reimbursed by 
DRG at the same time that payment to primary care doctors changed from salaries to 
mainly capitation, likely providing more incentives for physicians to refer patients to 
hospitals (and for hospitals to admit these additional patients) than in countries where 
DRG  introduction  in inpatient care was accompanied  by  a predominant FFS 
arrangement  for primary care doctors.  In order to control for the effects of 
contemporaneous primary care payment reforms, we include in our models three 
dummy variables indicating the presence of salaries, capitation and fee-for-service 
methods for paying doctors in a given country-year combination. We also include, in 
our vector of covariates, a dummy variable for whether prospective global budgets 
(caps in reimbursement or services provided) were in place at the hospital level, as in 
a minority of cases these were implemented alongside the introduction of PBP or FFS 
and  may affect the response of hospitals to the new payment methods.  The data 
sources for the primary care payment and global budget dummies are the same used to 
construct the hospital payment indicators. 
6.  Results 
We present first the results of the specification tests, followed by the estimates 
of the impacts of provider payment reforms on our health sector outcomes. 
6.1   Specification tests 
The first columns of Table 3 report the results of the parallel trend assumption 
(PTA) tests for our random  trend and differential  trend models, i.e. applied 
(respectively) to eqns (8) and (12), and the preferred specification implied by the PTA     28 
tests for each health sector outcome. The PTA, and hence our basic difference-in-
differences (DID) model described by eqn (4), is rejected at conventional levels of 
significance in five instances in favor of the random trend model (for cerebrovascular 
and digestive system diseases, bed occupancy rate and death rates for ischemic heart 
disease and diabetes) and in one instance in favor of the differential trend model 
(hospital beds). We thus focus on the differential trend model results for the number 
of beds, and on the random trend model results for the former five outcomes; for the 
remaining dependent variables, the data seem consistent with the PTA and, 
consequently, we focus on the results from the basic DID model. 
According to the results from the reverse causality tests reported in the last 
three columns of Table 3, the preferred models for each outcome account adequately 
for the potential endogeneity of provider payment reforms in our sample of countries. 
Of the 19  outcomes selected for our study, the only case  for which the  joint 
insignificance of the lead payment dummies is rejected at conventional levels in the 
corresponding preferred model is  the death rate for diabetes;  for this particular 
variable, we must acknowledge that the preferred specification does not seem suited 
to provide reliable estimates of the impacts of provider payment reforms.
29
                                                 
29 Similar results are obtained if the basic DID or DT models are used instead for this specific outcome. 
All sets of results mentioned in this paper but not shown are available from the authors upon request. 
 
Nonetheless, for all the remaining health sector outcomes in the present empirical 
work, our econometric specifications appear to be well-suited to the task in light of 
the available evidence.     29 
6.2   Main estimates  
Table 4 reports the coefficients for the two hospital payment dummies (and 
associated p-value for the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient)  estimated in the 
preferred specification for each health sector outcome. Also shown are the FFS and 
PBP percentage impacts implied by the corresponding coefficients, calculated over 
the mean outcome variable in the corresponding estimating sub-sample. Our main 
findings (that reflect our main results and the results of our sensitivity analyses 
reported below) are summarized for convenience in Table 1.  
Hospital admissions. The results suggest that the introduction of FFS as the 
main hospital reimbursement method in preference to historical  budgets (holding 
constant  primary care payment methods  and the presence of prospective global 
budgets for hospitals) increases total  admissions. This is in accordance with our 
hypothesized impact, yet the point estimate from the preferred model implies a 
relatively small effect (just 2%). This positive impact of FFS seems to occur across all 
types of admissions: we observe statistically significant increases for all except one 
measures of hospital discharges—circulatory, respiratory, digestive and 
musculoskeletal system diseases; the preferred models suggest positive impacts 
ranging from 6-8%. By contrast, and contrary to what we were expecting, there seems 
to be no impact on inpatient admissions of a shift from historical budgets to PBP 
methods, a result which is corroborated by the general absence of statistically 
significant estimated impacts (and small point estimates) of PBP methods on our 
discharge measures.  
Average length of stay. Shifts from budgets to FFS do not seem to affect the 
average length of stay (ALOS): our point estimate is negative but  statistically     30 
insignificant. By contrast, and consistent with our expectations, switches from budgets 
to PBP do lead to a statistically significant reduction of 3.5% in ALOS.  
Beds and bed occupancy rates. Because FFS (relative to budgets) seems to 
raise the number of admissions without reducing ALOS, it increases the number of 
inpatient days. By the bed occupancy constraint—eqn  (1)—there should be a 
corresponding increase in the number of beds and/or the bed occupancy rate. In the 
event, however, we find that neither is affected by FFS introduction: despite being of 
the expected positive sign, the preferred coefficient estimates are nowhere near being 
statistically significant. By contrast, because PBP leads to no change in admissions 
but reduces ALOS, we should expect the implied fall in inpatient days to be 
accompanied by reductions in the number of beds and/or the bed occupancy rate. 
Indeed, we find that PBP introduction leads to an average 5% decrease in the bed 
occupancy rate compared to budgets, and a negative but statistically insignificant 
effect on the number of beds.  
Total health spending. According to the results of the specification tests, the 
simplest model consistent with the data on health spending per capita is the basic DID 
specification, which is estimated using eqn (5). The preferred model points to a 
sizeable increase of about 20% in national  health spending in countries that 
introduced FFS as the main hospital reimbursement method in preference to budgets 
(again holding constant factors such as payment methods in primary care and the 
existence of global budgets). This estimated impact is statistically significant at the 
1% level and is equivalent to FFS increasing annual total spending by around $81 per 
capita, compared to the situation when historical budgets were the prevailing payment 
method. In relative terms, around 36% of the estimated rise in total health spending     31 
associated with the shift to FFS is due to increased private spending: we estimate a 
statistically significant rise  of about 28% (or  $29  per capita)  per year on this 
component due to FFS introduction, whereas the statistically significant point estimate 
for public spending per capita indicates a smaller proportionate increase of around 
17% (or $52 per capita).  
The estimated rise in national health spending brought about by paying 
hospitals through FFS methods rather than budgets (20%) is much larger than the 
corresponding estimated increase in admissions (2%). There are two possible 
explanations. One is that the extra spending was confined to the hospital sector, and 
that  the average cost  per admission increased (by a sizeable magnitude) after the 
introduction of FFS. The difference between the estimated percentage increases in 
total spending and admissions, of around 18 percentage points, indirectly provides an 
upper bound for the impact of FFS on the cost per admission.
30
Adopting PBP methods over historical budgets also appears to lead to higher 
total  health spending.  Switches to PBP raise annual national health spending per 
capita by around 11% (or $46). Similarly to the FFS case, the rise in private spending 
seems to have been a major force behind the increase in total expenditures, with a 
 The other explanation 
is that the shift to FFS in the hospital sector raised spending throughout the health 
system, not just in the hospital sector. Spending on other types of care (e.g. 
ambulatory care and drugs) may have increased, but so too may administrative costs. 
In the absence of adequate panel data on cost  per admission, we are unable to 
distinguish between these two competing explanations.  
                                                 
30 Directly testing the hypothesis of increased costs per admission in FFS systems is not possible here, 
unfortunately, due to the previously noted unavailability of usable panel data on such variable for the 
ECA countries.     32 
statistically significant point estimate of around 23% ($24). The point estimate for 
public spending suggests a smaller though statistically insignificant percentage rise of 
about 7% ($22) on this component due to PBP arrangements.  Again, the extra 
spending could have been due to an increase in expenditure per admission, or to extra 
spending elsewhere in the health system. It is worth noting that, although the 
magnitudes of the point estimates for our three health spending variables are larger for 
FFS than PBP methods, Wald tests of the hypothesis of equality of the FFS and PBP 
coefficients cannot reject the null hypothesis, with p-values in excess of 0.4.  
Amenable mortality. In spite of the higher hospital activity rates and spending 
estimated for countries using FFS methods in preference to historical budgets, there is 
no evidence that the introduction of the former payment method has any effect—
either beneficial or deleterious—on  amenable mortality. The estimated FFS 
coefficients are very small in magnitude for the six death causes examined here
31, 
with negative and positive point estimates evenly distributed (the mean impact is just 
0.4%). The p-values are very large, and none of the impacts comes anywhere close to 
being statistically significant. A different story emerges in the PBP results. We find 
that PBP significantly reduces amenable mortality for two causes, namely deaths by 
ischemic heart disease (reduced by around 4% according to the preferred model) and 
cerebrovascular diseases (diminished by around 5%). Furthermore, all but one of the 
point estimates is negative, and the magnitudes are considerably larger than in the 
case of FFS (the mean impact in the PBP results is -7.2%).
32
                                                 
31 Recall that our specification tests indicate that the preferred model in the case of the standardized 
death rate by diabetes fails to account adequately for reverse causality. For this reason, we do not 
discuss the regression estimates obtained for this seventh amenable mortality indicator. 
32 In general, no statistically significant or otherwise noteworthy effects on our health sector outcomes 
are found for the primary care payment methods and global budget dummies in the preferred 
specifications.  
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6.3   Robustness of estimates to payment method classifications 
As already noted, the analysis reported so far is based on the predominant 
hospital payment method (in terms of hospital revenues) observed in each country-
year combination. Although the predominant payment arrangement at a given time is 
fairly  clear for most countries in our sample, there are some cases where the 
importance of a second method seems far from being negligible, sometimes reaching 
one-third or more of the average hospital’s funding. We thus explore the sensitivity of 
the impact estimates reported in the previous sub-section to changing the hospital 
payment classification for some country-year combinations where such ambiguities 
exist in view of the available information; the alternative classifications are described 
in Table 5 and the new impact estimates are reported in Table 6 (Panel A).
33
6.4   Robustness of estimates to allowance for lagged effects  
 
Most of the estimated impacts of FFS and PBP on our health sector outcomes 
change little when the alternative payment method classifications are used, both in 
terms of the statistical significance of individual coefficients and their magnitude. 
There are, however, a couple of important changes, namely that a shift to PBP no 
longer has significant effects on ALOS or amenable mortality.  
As a second robustness check of our results, we investigate the sensitivity of 
the estimates to relaxing the restriction that changes in the predominant provider 
payment method and any resulting changes in outcomes occur contemporaneously, as 
assumed in the three main specifications estimated in this paper—i.e. equations (5), 
(8) and (11).  It can be argued, for instance, that the impacts of provider payment 
                                                 
33 In this sub-section, we follow the same empirical methodology described in the previous sub-section 
as far as specification tests, model selection and estimations are concerned. As before, reverse causality 
does not seem to be an issue in our data once we employ our regression-based generalizations of the 
difference-in-differences approach.     34 
reforms on outcomes such as hospital activity rates and amenable mortality indicators 
may take more than a year to be observed; in this case, the small and insignificant 
effects estimated for some dependent variables in our original specifications should be 
strictly interpreted as the absence of contemporaneous impacts, and not necessarily as 
the absence of any impacts over time. To address this concern, we expand the original 
DID and RT models (equations (4) and (7)) by including the first lags of the FFS and 
PBP dummies alongside the current values of these dummies and all the original 
covariates.
34
Panel B of 
 We therefore allow for both instantaneous and (one-year) lagged impacts 
of provider payment reforms on our  health sector  outcomes in the expanded 
specifications, and any differences between the results of the latter and the original 
specifications for a given outcome in effect signal that there are adjustments after the 
initial impact (or the absence of it). 
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients of the current and lagged 
values of the FFS and PBP dummies in the expanded models, along with the 
coefficients given by a linear combination of the current and lagged values for FFS 
and PBP, and the implied impact estimates by such linear combinations (that is, the 
cumulative effects of FFS and PBP after a lag of one year). The results from the 
expanded models tend to confirm those obtained from our original specifications and 
often provide valuable insights on the temporal pattern of reform impacts.  
Hospital admissions. Lagged (positive) effects of the introduction of FFS over 
budgets seem to be important as far as the number of admissions is concerned, leading 
                                                 
34 We would have liked to include additional lags of the payment dummies in the models so as to 
investigate differential impacts of the reforms over time; however, it seems unwise to do so in light of 
our relatively small sample size. Similarly, the huge burden imposed to the data by estimating an 
expanded DT model—which requires the inclusion of interactions between the payment dummies and 
time dummies—has also led us to estimate expanded versions of the DID and RT specifications only.     35 
now to a higher and significant cumulative impact estimate of almost 8% (of which 
5% is due to the lagged effect, in addition to the contemporaneous impact estimate of 
3%—both estimates significant at the 1% level and the latter close to our original 2% 
estimate). The originally estimated absence of effects on admissions  of replacing 
historical budgets by PBP arrangements is  also  generally  confirmed in the new 
specifications.  
Average length of stay. Similar results with respect to ALOS emerge with the 
lagged effects. The shift to FFS  has no significant effect, while the shift to PBP 
decreases ALOS by 4.5% (significant at the 4% level; the difference between the two 
PBP estimates is just one percentage point and is entirely due to a post-first year 
adjustment in the dependent variable—not precisely estimated).  
Beds and bed occupancy rates.  Allowing for adjustments after the initial 
effects leads to an unearthing of a positive impact of FFS on the bed occupancy rate 
which matches the estimated increase in admissions; the former is now found to 
significantly increase by about 8% as well, and the impact is mainly identifiable one 
year after FFS introduction. In the case of PBP too the bed occupancy rate seems to be 
positively affected with a lag: a negative contemporaneous point estimate (which has 
an associated p-value of 0.153 and is equivalent to an impact of about 4%, close to the 
original impact estimate) is offset by a positive lagged point estimate (equivalent to an 
impact of 3.5%), resulting in a negative yet small and statistically insignificant 
cumulative PBP effect.   
Total health spending. The expanded models also confirm the sizeable positive 
effects of FFS adoption on national health spending, both public and private, relative     36 
to budgets. Interestingly, all FFS spending impacts are found to occur already in the 
first year such payment method is in place, and by similar magnitudes to those 
reported by the original models: the statistically significant point estimates imply 
contemporaneous FFS effects of around 18%, 16% and 22% on total, public and 
private spending (respectively), with cumulative impacts of around 18% for each of 
these indicators (hence, in the new specifications, there seem to be no major 
differences between the relative, cumulative spending impacts on public and private 
spending). Furthermore, the new specifications not only confirm the originally found 
positive spending effects of PBP introduction over historical budgets, but also point to 
even larger cumulative effects—ranging from around 19-22% for the three spending 
categories, close to the corresponding FFS impact estimates—once lagged 
adjustments are taken into account. The statistical insignificance at conventional 
levels of the linearly combined PBP point estimate for private spending (which 
nonetheless has a small associated p-value of 0.164) seems to be driven by the fact 
that such spending variable is once again affected mainly contemporaneously by the 
reforms—equivalent to a PBP impact of about 19%—with no further (delayed) 
adjustments. Public expenditures, on the other hand, are increased by approximately 
10% with a one-year lag due to PBP adoption (estimated coefficient significant at the 
1% level), and the contemporaneous point estimate suggests an additional impact of 
around 12% (p-value of 0.173), resulting in a cumulative PBP effect of 22% on public 
spending (significant at the 5% level). Thus, for public spending, the relatively small 
and statistically insignificant impact of PBP adoption found in the original DID 
specification is “corrected” by taking into consideration the important lagged effect of 
PBP  introduction on such indicator. Accounting for the latter leads, in turn, to a 
positive and statistically significant estimate of the lagged PBP effect on total health     37 
spending (of around 8%) and a resulting cumulative PBP impact of about 21%, 10 
percentage points larger than the estimate previously found in the original DID 
specification.  
Amenable mortality.  The general absence of FFS effects (either 
contemporaneous or with a lag) is still the case according to the results of the 
expanded models. The new results for PBP adoption are also in accordance with the 
main impact estimates, indicating a statistically significant cumulative reduction in the 
death rate for ischemic heart disease (a reduction of around 6%) and negative point 
estimates for all mortality indicators.
35
7.  Summary and discussion 
     
After the breakup  of the Soviet Union and the subsequent transition to 
capitalism, several Central and Eastern European and Central Asian (ECA) countries 
aimed at reforming their provider payment systems as an instrument to achieve the 
general objectives of protecting health spending levels and improving the overall 
performance of the health sector. This reformist wave provides a unique opportunity 
to assess empirically the system-wide impacts of different provider payment methods. 
Most of the major reforms in the ECA region involved, among other elements, a 
change in the predominant hospital reimbursement method, with some countries 
switching their payment system more than once after the transition from communism. 
                                                 
35  Given the comparative nature of our robustness check exercises, we do not discuss the impact 
estimates for the diabetes death rate; see footnote 31. For consistency, we also estimated the expanded 
models using the alternative country-year classification of provider payment methods presented in 
Table 5, obtaining again broadly similar results (not shown) to those reported in the main text. In 
particular, the point estimates for FFS introduction indicate increases of around 7% and 6% in 
admissions and the bed occupancy rate (respectively), and contemporaneous positive spending impacts 
(across the board) of about 17%. As for PBP adoption, the main difference in results is the lack of a 
statistically significant cumulative impact on ALOS—though we find a significant, negative 
contemporaneous effect of 2% on this outcome—whereas total health spending is still significantly 
increased yet by a smaller cumulative estimate of around 13%.      38 
This paper uses the health sector reforms implemented by ECA countries over the 
1990s and early 2000s as an “experiment” to investigate empirically the system-wide 
impacts of introducing fee-for-service (FFS, encompassing both per procedure and per 
diem mechanisms) and patient-based payment PBP (PBP, mainly per case and DRG-
based systems) as the main hospital reimbursement method—relative to the previous 
communist system of line-item, historical budgets—on a set of outcomes including 
hospital activity rates and capacity utilization, national health spending, and mortality 
amenable to health care.  
In our empirical work, we use panel data from 28 ECA countries for the period 
1990-2004  and  employ, in addition to  a simpler regression-based difference-in-
differences approach, two generalizations of the latter model in order to control for 
the potential endogeneity of provider payment reforms: a random trend model 
(allowing for linearly time-changing unobservables which may vary at different rates 
between countries, and may be correlated with both the choice of hospital payment 
method and the outcome of interest) and a differential trend model (allowing for non-
linearly time-changing unobservables which may vary at different rates between 
groups of countries—i.e. budget, FFS  and PBP countries—and may be correlated 
with the choice of hospital payment method and health outcomes). In the latter two 
models, we assess the validity of the parallel trend assumption which is inherent to the 
simpler difference-in-differences approach and use the results of the tests to identify 
the most suitable model for our data among the three alternatives, for the case of each 
health outcome. We also formally test for the presence of reverse causality in payment 
reforms (that is, reforms being driven by changes in our health sector outcomes); in 
the event, we find that, for all but one of the selected health outcomes, our 
econometric models perform well in controlling for the potential endogeneity of FFS     39 
and PBP introduction in our sample of ECA countries. Importantly, we control for 
concurrent reforms in the way health systems are funded, i.e. through general tax-
financing or social health insurance arrangements; contemporaneous payment reforms 
in the primary care sector; and the existence of prospective global budgets at the 
hospital level. We find that our main estimates are mostly robust to changing the 
predominant hospital payment method classification for countries where there are 
other important payment systems  in place, and to allowing for (one-year) lagged 
impacts of the reforms in addition to any contemporaneous effects. 
Compared to historical budgets and according to the preferred specifications, 
we find that the introduction of FFS—holding constant payment methods for primary 
care providers, among other factors—increases inpatient admissions (with widespread 
effects across different types of admission) but does not affect the average length of 
stay (ALOS). Both results are consistent with our theoretical expectations. Allowing 
for lagged effects of payment reform leads to a 7.5% estimated increase in admissions 
due to FFS. By the bed occupancy constraint, we should expect either the number of 
beds or the bed occupancy rate to rise; indeed, once lagged adjustments are accounted 
for, we find that FFS raises the latter indicator by about 8%. Also consistent with our 
priors, FFS increases  health  spending per capita  by as much as 20% (a 
contemporaneous effect which is due both to higher current government and private 
expenditures). This 20% increase coupled with the 7.5% increase in admissions could 
mean that the cost per admission is increased by a shift from budgets to FFS, or that 
the shift to FFS increases spending outside the hospital sector. In spite of the increase 
in health spending, we find no evidence that using FFS in preference to budgets leads 
to a reduction in amenable mortality.      40 
Turning to the results for PBP, contrary to our expectations, inpatient 
admissions do not seem to be affected by a shift from budgets to PBP methods; by 
contrast, PBP adoption does seem to reduce ALOS as expected (by about 4%). The 
resulting decrease in inpatient days is matched by a commensurate reduction in the 
bed occupancy rate. Shifting from historical budgets to PBP also increases health 
spending. Taking into account lagged impacts (mostly relevant to public spending) in 
addition to the contemporaneous rise in private expenditures, the estimated increase in 
total spending due to PBP is of around 21%, very close to the corresponding FFS 
estimate. Given the lack of impact of PBP on admissions, the implication is that 
PBP—like FFS—increases  the cost of a typical hospital  admission, or results in 
substantially higher health spending outside the hospital sector. However, in contrast 
to the case of the FFS impacts, there is some evidence that switching from budgets to 
PBP methods may lead to lower amenable mortality. We find significant negative 
effects on death rates for ischemic heart and cerebrovascular diseases, in addition to 
point estimates for the remaining measures that are generally negative and larger in 
absolute size than those for FFS. However, the significance of these estimates is not 
robust to the changes in payment method classifications, and Wald tests indicate that 
the FFS and PBP coefficients are not significantly different from one another for any 
amenable mortality outcome.  
What are the most plausible  interpretations  for the above results? Taken 
together, our findings that FFS has (a) no impact on ALOS and (b) a larger impact on 
health spending than on admissions are consistent with FFS leading to a higher cost 
per admission.  The explanation would be that rising costs are driven by extra 
procedures being supplied to a given patient and to a lesser degree by additional     41 
admissions,  rather than by  prolonged  hospital  stays.
36
Our results certainly suggest that a sizeable part of the rise in health spending 
caused by a shift from budgets to FFS is due a rise in private spending.
  This line of argument is 
consistent with previous theoretical and empirical research on the general effects of 
this reimbursement method (cf. Ellis and McGuire 1986; Yip and Eggleston 2001; 
among others).  However, our results are also consistent with additional health 
spending occurring outside  the hospital sector. With our data, we are unable to 
discriminate between these two hypotheses. Of course, both may be true.  
37
                                                 
36 With regard to the absence of FFS impacts on ALOS in our sample, it is worth noting that even 
hospitals in countries where per-diem was the prevailing reimbursement method may have faced no 
incentives to increase ALOS, relative to the level observed under historical budgets. For instance, in the 
case of the Slovak Republic, there is evidence that bed day prices did not cover the real costs of 
hospitals, with costs exceeding the  prices paid by the health insurance companies by up to 30% 
according to some calculations (Hlavačka et al. 2004).   
37 Out-of-pocket expenditures represented on average 92% of private spending in the ECA countries in 
1998, with a similar figure across groups of FFS and PBP adopters. In 2004, those figures were still 
very high (in excess of 86%). The data were obtained from the WHO’s Health for All database; there is 
no available data prior to 1998. With only a few exceptions (e.g. Slovenia), voluntary health insurance 
does not play an important role in the countries of the ECA region. 
 Again, this 
extra spending could be in the hospital sector, or outside the hospital sector. In the 
latter case, it could be that patients admitted in hospital are incurring expenditures on 
complementary ambulatory care services or purchasing additional drugs. Or it could 
be that people are substituting away from hospital care knowing that FFS encourages 
providers to deliver additional care not all of which may be medically necessary and 
instead making greater use of ambulatory care and drugs. Our data do not allow us to 
discriminate between these explanations. And, again, both could be true. Indeed, both 
are plausible. It does indeed seem to be the case that hospital payment reforms in the 
ECA countries often  entailed  not  only a decision that the government will pay 
hospitals differently (leading to higher public spending after the reforms, consistent 
with the results above), but also a decision that hospitals will be allowed to recover 
some of their costs from out-of-pocket payments from patients. In many cases, user     42 
charges and co-payments for hospital care—sometimes reaching 25% for selected 
inpatient services, e.g. surgeries—were introduced alongside (or closely following) 
switches from budgets to either FFS or PBP, with such extra funds being channeled 
directly from patients to providers.
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In the above scenario, the lack of FFS impacts on amenable mortality suggests 
that most of the additional health spending and the additional hospital care caused by 
a switch from budgets to FFS did not bring any perceptible benefits to patients in 
terms of extra years of life. A negative interpretation of our results would then be that 
any extra (public and private) expenditure associated with a typical hospital admission 
simply gives providers additional rents and that the additional admissions caused by a 
shift to FFS are generally unnecessary ones where the patient could have been treated 
perfectly well by a lower-level provider. A more positive interpretation would be that 
 For the countries in our sample, such concerns 
tend to be aggravated by the extra private costs arising from the continued and 
widespread prevalence of informal payments perceived in many of the ECA health 
systems (Lewis 2002). But there is also evidence that out-of-pocket spending on drugs 
increased in some countries following the transition from the old Semashko system 
(Habicht et al. 2006); whether this was contemporaneous with let alone a consequence 
of changes to hospital payment methods is unclear, however. Whatever the 
explanation of the impact of hospital payment reform on private spending, the results 
in our paper raise  concerns about the potentially pervasive effects that the joint 
implementation of co-payments and user charges on the one hand, and new payment 
methods such as FFS on the other hand, may have on access to health care and the 
incidence of catastrophic health spending (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003).  
                                                 
38 This was the case, among other countries, in Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Romania and the Slovak 
Republic.     43 
the extra admissions and  any  increased costliness of admissions resulted in 
improvements in people’s quality  of life, which we do  not  capture  through our 
mortality measures. 
What about the results for PBP methods? As discussed in Section 3, a hospital 
paid per case can increase its profits by treating more patients; by cutting on inputs 
per case treated;  and/or selecting the more profitable cases (if patient selection is 
possible). Our results indicate that PBP-paid hospitals in the adopter ECA countries 
did not generally seek to profit from treating larger numbers of patients, but did cut 
inpatient days by reducing an  important input, namely length of stay.  Instead of 
reductions in the normally excessive beds supply inherited from the communist era, 
any efficiency gains from the improved use of resources under PBP seem to have 
been achieved by a reduction in the bed-occupancy rate. This may reflect political 
constraints: individual hospitals may find it hard to close wards, and ministries of 
health and regional governments—who are still operating most (or all) hospitals in the 
majority of ECA countries, including the PBP adopters—may find it hard to close 
hospitals. In this context, cutting the bed-occupancy rate seems easier politically. Our 
finding that the introduction of PBP leads to a rise in health expenditures but no 
increase in admissions is consistent with an increased cost per admission, which is 
consistent with previous research (e.g., Ellis and McGuire 1986; Dafny 2005). The 
evidence also points to a similar relative effect of PBP methods on public and private 
spending, the latter (as discussed for the case of FFS) due either to the introduction of 
co-payments and user charges for inpatient care alongside provider payment reforms, 
or to people substituting away from hospital care to other providers. Either way there     44 
is a concern about  reduced  access to care and  higher risk of  catastrophic health 
spending.
39
But  our findings are also consistent with a less positive interpretation:  in 
addition to any genuine health benefits induced by the development of treatment 
protocols, PBP introduction may have led to apparent improvements in amenable 
mortality as a consequence of different forms of patient selection. Patient selection by 
  
Given the above, our (admittedly rather weak) findings regarding the effects of 
PBP on amenable mortality can be explained by a couple of plausible causal chains. 
The negative effect on ALOS might lead us to worry about unduly early discharges 
and higher mortality rates among hospital patients. Insofar as our results reflect an 
increased cost per admission following a switch to PBP, the implication is that this 
increased intensity of care more than offsets any damaging effect on mortality of a 
shorter length of stay. But this begs the question of why the extra resources associated 
with the switch to FFS did not also lead to lower amenable mortality  rates.  One 
explanation would be that the introduction of PBP encouraged providers to focus on 
appropriate and effective medical care, while the introduction of FFS  simply 
encouraged hospitals to supply extra services irrespective of their effectiveness and 
appropriateness. In some countries, treatment protocols were introduced when case-
based or DRG systems were introduced; these took the form of clinical pathways and 
guidelines in countries such as Bulgaria and Slovenia, and it is possible that these 
measures resulted in better quality of care and improved health status for hospital 
inpatients.  
                                                 
39 As a couple of examples among the group of PBP adopter countries, it has been estimated that 
around 86% of inpatients pay for hospital care in the Kyrgyz Republic, and that a single case of 
hospitalization can consume a full month’s earnings of a poor family through out-of-pocket payments 
in Georgia, effectively deterring access to care. See the corresponding country reports in the HiT series.      45 
hospitals may not only have taken the “classic” form of a preference for patients with 
the more profitable diagnoses, but also the subtler form of hospitals artificially 
upcoding patients to more lucrative conditions, the so-called “DRG creep” (cf. e.g. 
Ellis and McGuire 1986).
40 If a group of hospitals in a given country attempted to 
raise revenues after PBP adoption by selecting more profitable patients—referring the 
less profitable ones to another group of providers—and misclassifying patients to 
more lucrative diagnoses, no effects of PBP introduction (relative to budgets) should 
be observed  on the overall  number of admissions  (assuming most  patients are 
eventually  admitted  somewhere),  but the aggregate cost per admission and health 
spending would rise, results that are consistent with the empirical findings in this 
paper.
41
                                                 
40 Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence on the existence of “DRG creep” for a number of ECA countries 
and preliminary statistical evidence on its presence at least for the Hungarian health system (Belli 
2003; Gaál 2004). Gaál (2004)’s conclusion for Hungary is based on the fact that “increases in the case 
mix index were not coupled with an increase in hospital mortality” (p.77). 
41 This is in accordance also with the findings of Dafny (2005) in the context of the implementation of 
prospective payment for Medicare admissions in the United States. 
 However, just as the absence of PBP effects on aggregate admissions and 
higher cost per admission may be logical consequences of patient selection by groups 
of hospitals within PBP countries, the likely existence of “DRG creep” behavior by 
hospitals may also result in apparent  mortality improvements  for some specific 
conditions.  Based on the findings by Cutler (1995) for  a different context,  if  the 
marginal  per case rates paid  to hospitals corresponding to ischemic heart and 
cerebrovascular diseases tended to increase  after PBP adoption  relative  to the 
marginal rates for other conditions, profit-seeking hospitals may have started coding 
as heart  and  cerebrovascular cases some  less serious conditions that, under the 
previous budget system, were not coded as such. It would be plausible, then, to 
observe the described upcoding process leading to a less severely ill pool of patients 
for these two disease categories in PBP-paid hospitals than in budget-paid hospitals,     46 
resulting in lower corresponding mortality rates as found in this paper. The presence 
of “DRG creep” means that the observed mortality reductions may actually reflect 
upcoding practices induced by the new relative prices rather than true improvements 
in population health.
42
                                                 
42 Unfortunately, data on relative changes of reimbursement rates across categories of diagnoses are not 
readily available for the ECA countries.  
  
On balance, our results suggest that PBP dominates FFS in that while both 
increase spending by similar percentages, only PBP appears to have any effect on 
amenable mortality. However, FFS does appear to raise inpatient days while PBP 
does not, and it is possible that these additional days of hospital care translate into 
improvements in health outcomes, albeit ones that do not get reflected in lower rates 
of amenable mortality. This suggests exploring a mix of two or more provider 
payment mechanisms,  including new modalities of global budgets  such as those 
piloted in Croatia, Czech Republic and the Russian region of Kemerovo (cf. Belli 
2003).      47 
Figure 1: Predominant hospital payment methods in the ECA region, 1990-2004 
 
 
Source:  WHO  HiT  series  (http://www.euro.who.int/observatory/Hits/TopPage), World Bank staff and country 
reports. 
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G Global budget (cap on reimbursement and/or services provided at the hospital level)
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Table 1: Hypothesized effects of shifting from line-item budgets, and main findings  
 
  Fee-for-service (FFS)  Patient-based payment (PBP) 
  Hypothesized effect  Estimated effect  Hypothesized effect  Estimated effect 
No. admissions  Positive.   A significant increase of 2-
7.5%. 
Positive (larger than FFS 
effect).  
No effect. 
Average length of 
stay 
Uncertain.   No effect.  Negative.   A significant reduction of 
3.5-4.5%. 
No. beds  Uncertain.   No effect.  Uncertain.   No effect. 
Bed-occupancy rate  Positive, assuming hospitals 
can alter their bed stock.  
A significant increase 
(mostly after one year) of 
8%. 
Positive, assuming hospitals 
can alter their bed stock.  
A contemporaneous 
negative effect offset by a 
lagged positive effect. 
Cost per admission  Uncertain but probably 
positive.  
Cannot test.  Negative.   Cannot test. 
Quality of care  Uncertain but possibly 
positive.  
Cannot test.  Uncertain but possibly 
negative.  
Cannot test. 
Total hospital costs  Uncertain but probably 
positive.  
Cannot test.  Uncertain.   Cannot test. 
Total health 
expenditure 
Positive.   Significant increase of 18-
19%, with similar 
percentage increases in 
public and private 
spending. 
Uncertain.   Significant increase of 11-
21%, with similar 
percentage increases in 
public and private 
spending. 
Amenable mortality  Uncertain but probably 
negative.  
No effects.  Uncertain.   Significant negative effects 
for some conditions in some 
model specifications.     49 
Table 2: Health sector outcome variables: descriptive statistics 
 
   Full sample     FFS = 1     PBP = 1     Historical budget = 1 
Dependent variable  Mean  S.D.  Obs     Mean  S.D.  Obs     Mean  S.D.  Obs     Mean  S.D.  Obs 
Inpatient admissions  16.01  5.89  389    18.65  3.28  62    16.29  6.59  71    15.29  6.00  256 
Hosp discharges - circulatory  1851.99  1046.65  346    2436.78  698.97  60    2232.06  1420.10  67    1575.50  880.67  219 
Hosp discharges - cerebrovascular  328.22  230.40  342    458.50  132.78  60    420.32  310.30  66    263.88  196.85  216 
Hosp discharges - respiratory  2070.39  998.60  343    1910.45  656.14  60    1761.68  767.77  67    2210.57  1109.31  216 
Hosp discharges - digestive  1599.84  609.19  346    1803.01  392.80  60    1493.78  630.65  67    1576.63  640.14  219 
Hosp discharges - musculoskeletal  756.42  493.11  346    1014.15  315.49  60    872.02  676.23  67    650.44  430.99  219 
Length of stay  12.77  3.07  390    11.55  2.13  62    10.73  2.01  71    13.62  3.14  257 
Hospital beds  8.08  2.91  339    7.43  1.71  51    7.08  1.67  53    8.45  3.24  235 
Bed occupancy rate  72.84  14.88  274     77.40  7.52  44     73.97  17.02  60     71.26  15.30  170 
Health expenditures - Total  388.24  283.91  317    645.64  231.34  55    552.10  411.95  59    270.88  152.77  203 
Health expenditures - Public  287.15  243.17  317    509.85  220.95  55    391.57  353.96  59    196.46  136.11  203 
Health expenditures - Private  101.09  72.38  317    135.78  68.46  55    160.53  84.73  59    74.42  52.97  203 
SDR ischemic heart disease  302.48  130.11  354     259.33  93.83  62     281.73  106.63  65     320.21  141.05  227 
SDR diabetes  15.08  8.62  354    13.26  6.57  62    17.06  12.10  65    15.02  7.80  227 
SDR cerebrovascular diseases  175.99  53.64  354    168.27  46.75  62    164.96  56.49  65    181.25  54.05  227 
SDR female breast cancer  21.52  6.72  354    26.39  3.13  62    24.63  5.90  65    19.30  6.62  227 
SDR appendicitis  0.30  0.18  341    0.22  0.14  62    0.22  0.11  63    0.35  0.19  216 
SDR hernia & intestinal  2.24  0.75  344    2.28  0.57  62    2.26  0.61  64    2.22  0.83  218 
SDR adverse effects  0.20  0.33  181     0.09  0.08  50     0.08  0.08  42     0.31  0.44  89 
Note: Mean, standard deviation (S.D.) and number of observations (Obs) for the full sample and for the sub-samples of country-year combinations with fee-for-service methods (FFS = 1), patient-based 
payment (PBP = 1) and budgets (Historical budget = 1) as the predominant hospital payment method.     50 
Table 3: Tests of the parallel trend assumption and reverse causality 
 
   Tests of the parallel trend assumption     Tests of reverse causality 
 
Random trend     








test on eqn (8)    Non-linear restriction 
test on eqn (12)   
Dependent variable  chi-square  p-value     F  p-value     FFSi,t+1  PBPi,t+1 
p-value 
(joint) 
Inpatient admissions  0.14  0.934    0.30  0.746  DID    0.10  0.32  0.625 
Hosp discharges - circulatory  3.68  0.159    2.20  0.132  DID    0.74  61.01  0.366 
Hosp discharges - cerebrovas  5.98**  0.050    0.19  0.827  RT    -1.47  11.40  0.426 
Hosp discharges - respiratory  4.29  0.117    0.05  0.948  DID    73.98  79.77  0.165 
Hosp discharges - digestive  4.94*  0.084    0.07  0.933  RT    41.67  78.58  0.155 
Hosp discharges - musculo  1.00  0.608    0.37  0.696  DID    21.31  43.68  0.104 
Length of stay  0.13  0.935    0.26  0.776  DID    0.09  -0.09  0.478 
Hospital beds  0.99  0.611    3.37**  0.050  DT    0.03  -0.07  0.858 
Bed occupancy rate  4.82*  0.090     1.31  0.290  RT    1.51  0.90  0.167 
Health expenditures - Total  0.13  0.938    0.16  0.852  DID     38.86  -8.56  0.155 
Health expenditures - Public  3.81  0.149    0.09  0.913  DID    28.18  -1.50  0.224 
Health expenditures - Private  1.76  0.415    0.02  0.978  DID     10.68  -7.05  0.393 
SDR ischemic heart disease  6.41**  0.040     0.42  0.659  RT    -2.80  -4.05  0.473 
SDR diabetes  4.98*  0.083    0.32  0.730  RT    0.96*  0.59*  0.063 
SDR cerebrovascular diseases  0.82  0.662    1.60  0.223  DID    -8.99  -1.94  0.211 
SDR female breast cancer  2.46  0.292    0.00  1.000  DID    0.04  -0.10  0.972 
SDR appendicitis  2.78  0.249    0.24  0.790  DID    -0.09  0.04  0.254 
SDR hernia & intestinal  2.19  0.334    1.19  0.323  DID    -0.36  -0.19  0.141 
SDR adverse effects  1.60  0.450     1.70  0.215  DID     0.06  0.08  0.516 
Notes: The symbols * and ** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of the corresponding parallel trend test or reverse causality test at 
the 10% and 5% levels, respectively (p-values from two-sided t-tests with cluster-robust standard errors).  The last column of the parallel 
trend tests shows the preferred model—difference-in-differences (DID), random trend (RT) or differential trend (DT)—implied by the 
test results for the corresponding dependent variable. Results of the reverse causality tests refer to the individual coefficients of the lead 
fee-for-service (FFS) and patient-based (PBP) payment methods dummies (respectively) in the preferred model, and p-values from two-
sided t-tests (with cluster-robust standard errors) for the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of these two variables. 
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Table 4: Estimated impacts of hospital payment methods on health sector outcomes 
 
   Preferred 
model 
Preferred model estimates 
Dependent variable  FFS  p-value  Impact  PBP  p-value  Impact 
Inpatient admissions  DID  0.35*  0.093  2.1%  0.04  0.827  0.3% 
Hosp discharges - circulatory  DID  156.01**  0.009  8.0%  84.64  0.494  4.4% 
Hosp discharges - cerebrovas  RT  16.61  0.244  4.8%  -12.79  0.302  -3.7% 
Hosp discharges - respiratory  DID  169.51**  0.004  8.2%  59.15  0.301  2.9% 
Hosp discharges - digestive  RT  111.2**  0.026  6.8%  17.11  0.608  1.0% 
Hosp discharges - musculo  DID  50.07*  0.079  6.3%  -21.52  0.320  -2.7% 
Length of stay  DID  -0.31  0.347  -2.5%  -0.44**  0.033  -3.5% 
Hospital beds  DT  0.09  0.749  1.1%  -0.12  0.575  -1.5% 
Bed occupancy rate  RT  0.50  0.819  0.7%  -3.79**  0.044  -5.2% 
Health expenditures - Total  DID  81.39**  0.007  19.9%  46.15*  0.057  11.3% 
Health expenditures - Public  DID  51.99*  0.051  17.1%  21.61  0.450  7.1% 
Health expenditures - Private  DID  29.39**  0.034  27.8%  24.54*  0.064  23.2% 
SDR ischemic heart disease  RT  -2.89  0.679  -0.9%  -12.66*  0.099  -4.1% 
SDR diabetes  RT  -0.51  0.708  -3.4%  -1.12  0.215  -7.6% 
SDR cerebrovascular diseases  DID  -1.95  0.582  -1.1%  -8.14**  0.035  -4.6% 
SDR female breast cancer  DID  0.35  0.567  1.6%  -0.45  0.390  -2.1% 
SDR appendicitis  DID  0.00  0.974  -0.8%  -0.05  0.170  -17.7% 
SDR hernia & intestinal  DID  0.03  0.823  1.5%  0.11  0.202  4.9% 
SDR adverse effects  DID  0.01  0.857  5.8%  -0.04  0.570  -19.5% 
Notes: Results refer to the coefficients of the fee-for-service (FFS) and patient-based (PBP) payment methods 
dummies estimated in the preferred model for each outcome—difference-in-differences (DID), random trend (RT) 
or differential trend (DT) model. P-values from two-sided t-tests with cluster-robust standard errors. FFS and PBP 
percentage impacts implied by the corresponding coefficients are calculated over the mean outcome variable in the 
corresponding estimating sub-sample. The symbols * and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% 
levels, respectively.       52 
Table 5: Alternative classifications of hospital payment methods in the ECA region 
 
Country  Alternative classification of 
hospital payment methods  Comments 
Bulgaria  B=1 1990-2003 
PBP=1 2004 
Per case payment introduced in 2001 but would reach 50% 
of social health insurance reimbursements only in 2004. 
Croatia  B=1 1990-92 
FFS=1 1993-2001 
PBP=1 2002 onwards 
In 2002, introduction of a parallel DRG-based payment 
system for costly interventions. 
Kazakhstan  B=1 1990-94 
PBP=1 1995 onwards 
Per case payment rolled-out only in 1999 but piloted since 
1995. 
Kyrgyz Republic  B=1 1990-2000 
PBP=1 2001 onwards 
It was only under the single payer system started in 2001 
that PBP was rolled-out in the whole country. 
Latvia  B=1 1990-93 
FFS=1 1994-97 
PBP=1 1998 onwards 
DRGs introduced in 1998 to be used along with FFS, 
representing about 20% of the total number of 
hospitalizations. 
Lithuania  B=1 1990-93 
PBP=1 1994 onwards 
Since 1994, funding of all republican hospitals (40% of 
beds) by cost per case; unified PBP system from 1997 
onwards. 
Poland  B=1 1990-98 
FFS=1 1999-2002 
PBP=1 2003 onwards 
Sickness funds introduced their own systems of DRGs in 
the year 2000, but uniform DRG classification took place 
only in 2003. 
Russian Federation  B=1 1990-92 
PBP=1 1993 onwards 
New payment methods introduced since 1993 by social 
health insurance agencies—mostly case-based payment 
variants—account for around one-third of hospital 
revenues. 
Turkmenistan   B=1 1990-95 
PBP=1 1996 onwards 
Voluntary health insurers started to pay hospitals per case 
in 1996, accounting for around 30% of the average 
hospital funding. 
Notes: Hospital payment methods are historical (line-item) budgets (B); fee-for-service (FFS) and patient-based payment (PBP).   
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Table 6: Robustness of impact estimates to alternative classifications and specification 
 
Panel A: Models with alternative payment methods classifications                         
                       
Dependent variable 
Preferred 
model  FFS  Impact  PBP  Impact                   
Inpatient admissions  DID  0.42**  2.6%  0.00  0.0%             
Hosp discharges - circulatory  DID  163.84**  8.4%  112.09  5.8%             
Hosp discharges - cerebrovas  DID  23.07**  6.6%  -1.99  -0.6%             
Hosp discharges - respiratory  RT  146.76**  7.1%  50.07  2.4%             
Hosp discharges - digestive  DID  105.07**  6.4%  7.15  0.4%             
Hosp discharges - musculo  DID  42.21  5.3%  -8.11  -1.0%             
Length of stay  DT  -0.06  -0.5%  -0.26  -2.0%             
Hospital beds  DID  -0.03  -0.4%  -0.34  -4.2%             
Bed occupancy rate  DT  -0.22  -0.3%  -3.33**  -4.6%             
Health expenditures - Total  DID  75.45**  18.4%  43.30*  10.6%                   
Health expenditures - Public  DID  50.60**  16.7%  23.17  7.6%             
Health expenditures - Private  DID  24.85**  23.5%  20.13  19.1%                   
SDR ischemic heart disease  DID  -4.47  -1.4%  -4.56  -1.5%             
SDR diabetes  RT  -0.72  -4.9%  -0.91  -6.1%             
SDR cerebrovascular diseases  DID  -2.40  -1.4%  -6.87  -3.9%             
SDR female breast cancer  DID  0.52  2.4%  -0.16  -0.7%             
SDR appendicitis  DID  -0.01  -2.3%  0.02  5.7%             
SDR hernia & intestinal  DID  -0.04  -1.8%  0.03  1.6%             
SDR adverse effects  DID  0.04  20.6%  0.02  7.3%                   
                       
Panel B: Models with lagged payment methods dummies added                 
             
Linear 
combination: two 






model  FFS 
Lagged 
FFS  PBP 
Lagged 
PBP     Coef  Impact     Coef  Impact 
Inpatient admissions  DID  0.48**  0.73**  0.00  0.50    1.21**  7.5%    0.50  3.1% 
Hosp discharges - circulatory  DID  153.62**  89.49  65.65  0.68   243.11**  12.5%    66.33  3.4% 
Hosp discharges - cerebrovas  DID  19.20  6.82  -12.66  14.31    26.02  7.4%    1.65  0.5% 
Hosp discharges - respiratory  DID  160.39**  169.83**  64.39  164.99*   330.22**  16.3%   229.38**  11.3% 
Hosp discharges - digestive  RT  102.68**  110.68**  17.37  56.01*   213.36**  13.1%    73.38  4.5% 
Hosp discharges - musculo  DID  47.76*  63.64**  -24.92  25.53   111.40**  14.1%    0.62  0.1% 
Length of stay  DID  -0.32  -0.06  -0.42**  -0.14    -0.38  -3.1%    -0.56**  -4.5% 
Hospital beds  DID  0.05  0.01  -0.04  0.13    0.05  0.7%    0.09  1.1% 
Bed occupancy rate  DID  2.02  3.68**  -2.79  2.51*    5.70**  7.9%    -0.28  -0.4% 
Health expenditures - Total  DID  73.00**  2.17  55.69**  32.06**     75.17*  18.4%     87.75**  21.4% 
Health expenditures - Public  DID  49.58*  6.22  36.03  31.00**    55.80*  18.4%    67.03**  22.1% 
Health expenditures - Private  DID  23.42*  -4.04  19.66*  1.06     19.37  18.2%     20.72  19.5% 
SDR ischemic heart disease  DID  -4.61  0.56  -12.75**  -4.89    -4.05  -1.3%    -17.64**  -5.7% 
SDR diabetes  DID  -0.83  -1.26  -1.26  -0.39    -2.09*  -13.9%    -1.65*  -11.0% 
SDR cerebrovascular diseases  DID  -2.39  -0.39  -8.30**  3.62    -2.78  -1.6%    -4.68  -2.6% 
SDR female breast cancer  DID  0.39  0.00  -0.54  0.16    0.39  1.8%    -0.38  -1.7% 
SDR appendicitis  DID  0.00  -0.03  -0.03  -0.07*    -0.03  -10.2%    -0.10  -34.2% 
SDR hernia & intestinal  RT  0.02  0.06  0.01  -0.07    0.09  3.9%    -0.06  -2.8% 
SDR adverse effects  DID  -0.01  -0.06  -0.15  -0.03     -0.07  -32.6%     -0.17  -79.4% 
Notes: Results in each panel refer to the coefficients of the fee-for-service (FFS) and patient-based (PBP) payment methods dummies 
estimated in the preferred model for each outcome—difference-in-differences (DID), random trend (RT) or differential trend (DT) model, 
implied by the corresponding tests of the parallel trend assumption (not shown). In Panel B, the coefficients of the first lags of the 
payment methods dummies and the linear combinations of FFS (level and lag) and PBP (level and lag) are also reported. The symbols * 
and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively, according to p-values from two-sided t-tests with cluster-
robust standard errors (not shown). FFS and PBP percentage impacts implied by the corresponding coefficients are calculated over the 
mean outcome variable in the corresponding estimating sub-sample.       54 
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